Posts with #php7

#php7

Public posts on X that use #php7.

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  1. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency@CISAgov
    Update to #PHP2Shell Alert: SIGMA rule helps identify potentially suspicious activity & incorporated partner resources. If your org can't update immediately or uses unsupported PHP 8.1 or earlier versions, take affected PHP-based systems offline until patched or updated.
    CISA Cyber @CISACyber
    🚨 Organizations should immediately patch critical PHP vulnerabilities CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619. These vulnerabilities enable unauthenticated #RCE and affect PHP installations serving web requests. Learn more: 🔗
    177226024.9K
  2. CISA Cyber@CISACyber
    🚨 Organizations should immediately patch critical PHP vulnerabilities CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619. These vulnerabilities enable unauthenticated #RCE and affect PHP installations serving web requests. Learn more: 🔗
    Download
    617352.3K297K
  3. Polymarket✓@Polymarket
    JUST IN: Developer creates deliberately vulnerable PHP website, loads it with $2,021 in Bitcoin, & challenges the internet to hack it — site breached & Bitcoin drained in under 20 hours.
    882463.9K274K
  4. Libu 🎃@LibuWangxian
    My theory for what happend to AO3: They didn't hear about the PHP thing in time, someone got into the website and started changing/deleting stuff. They hoped it was a small hack and could restore it quickly. Turns out the entire website is vulnerable and have to rebuild much more
    Download
    8917122.3K
  5. The Hacker News@TheHackersNews
    UPDATE: Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 has retracted its earlier assessment linking the European government agency attack to PHP2Shell exploitation. The attack involved a vulnerable PHP application, but Unit 42 says it cannot confirm initial access was tied to the specific PHP2Shell CVEs. We've updated our report ↓
    The Hacker News @TheHackersNews
    🚨 PHP2Shell attackers accessed MFA secrets and password hashes at a European government entity in just 2 hours. That's not all. → Signs of agentic AI use in post-exploitation activity → Suspected Lazarus-linked operators scanning 216 targets worldwide Full details ↓
    174723241.8K
  6. The Hacker News@TheHackersNews
    🚨 PHP2Shell attackers accessed MFA secrets and password hashes at a European government entity in just 2 hours. That's not all. → Signs of agentic AI use in post-exploitation activity → Suspected Lazarus-linked operators scanning 216 targets worldwide Full details ↓
    Download
    532891.2K177K
  7. CISA Cyber@CISACyber
    Update to #PHP2Shell Alert: SIGMA rule helps identify potentially suspicious activity & incorporated partner resources. If your org can't update immediately or uses unsupported PHP 8.1 or earlier versions, take affected PHP-based systems offline until patched or updated.
    CISA Cyber @CISACyber
    🚨 Organizations should immediately patch critical PHP vulnerabilities CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619. These vulnerabilities enable unauthenticated #RCE and affect PHP installations serving web requests. Learn more: 🔗
    2116661371.6K
  8. The Hacker News@TheHackersNews
    ‼️ PHP patches Windows builds AGAIN, just 5 days after the PHP2Shell fixes. This time, a Brotli flaw could allow code execution when cURL automatically decompresses crafted HTTP responses. Updated builds cover PHP 8.2–8.5. Full details:
    Download
    1512552168.6K
  9. Daniel Púa✓@devploit
    PHP2Shell update 🚀 13 → 56 perfiles. 5 → 30 con RCE. Gracias a las aportaciones de la comunidad por ampliar la colección. Nuevos: stage-3 vessel 8.5.0–8.5.10, Debian 13/apxs2 y nginx+PHP-FPM.
    0191135K
  10. Kashaf✓@noor36758
    Programming Languages and Their Origins 🌍 • Python — 🇳🇱 Netherlands • JavaScript — 🇺🇸 United States • Java — 🇺🇸 United States • C — 🇺🇸 United States • C++ — 🇩🇰 Denmark • Go — 🇺🇸 United States • Rust — 🇺🇸 United States • Ruby — 🇯🇵 Japan • PHP — 🇩🇰 Denmark • Swift — 🇺🇸 United States Which language will dominate the future?
    629957.9K
  11. Trail of Bits✓@trailofbits
    Our demo shows PHP2Shell giving a shell on MediaWiki, Symfony, Laravel, and phpBB. We’ve confirmed exploits work on pre-patch releases of PHP 8.2–8.5. If you haven’t updated, assume attackers can compromise your server, and that exploitation will only get easier.
    Download
    Dan Guido @dguido
    Update: Our PHP exploit is now production-grade. * stock php.ini-production, display_errors=off, normal memory_limit, multi-worker, ASLR, under load * ARM64 + x86-64 targets * MediaWiki, WordPress, phpBB, Laravel * Apache/mod_php and nginx/php-fpm -> root
    145128436.9K
  12. Dan Guido✓@dguido
    Update: Our PHP exploit is now production-grade. * stock php.ini-production, display_errors=off, normal memory_limit, multi-worker, ASLR, under load * ARM64 + x86-64 targets * MediaWiki, WordPress, phpBB, Laravel * Apache/mod_php and nginx/php-fpm -> root
    Download
    39104676109K
  13. LiveOverflow 🔴 hextree.io✓@LiveOverflow
    I took a closer look at the CTF, which aims to demonstrate that PHP2SHELL is not realistically exploitable. So I gave it a try. Note: My analysis could be wrong, and I'm more than happy to be proven otherwise. Here’s what I found: • The server responds with Server: nginx and X-Powered-By: PHP/8.4.26. • My differential fingerprinting scanner independently confirmed at least PHP 8.2+ • Hypotheses: I considered two possible setups: ◦ nginx → PHP-FPM ◦ nginx → Apache → PHP-FPM/mod_php • After comparing the server's behavior against local test environments, the closest match appears to be nginx → PHP cli-server. Plot twist: the response behavior is consistent with the PHP cli-server serving a static index.html rather than an index.php. If that's indeed the case, the challenge appears to be intentionally made unexploitable. My conclusion (for now) is that I'm questioning whether this is a good-faith challenge. Happy to be corrected if I've missed something!
    Download
    89982.2K574K
  14. Matthew Prince 🌥✓@eastdakota
    This one maybe as bad or worse than the PHP ones. Get used to lots of patching.
    Greg Brockman @gdb
    we've found and have been working on disclosure for a remote code execution in a widely-deployed compression library. it's both an impactful issue and an example that shows how complicated it can be to coordinate patching, since it's integrated into a lot of downstream software:
    511301.9K214K
  15. Greg Brockman✓@gdb
    we've found and have been working on disclosure for a remote code execution in a widely-deployed compression library. it's both an impactful issue and an example that shows how complicated it can be to coordinate patching, since it's integrated into a lot of downstream software:
    1771853.2K472K
  16. The Hacker News@TheHackersNews
    🚨 CISA adds two PHP2Shell bugs to its KEV catalog after confirming active exploitation. CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619 enable unauthenticated remote code execution on affected PHP deployments. Read ↓
    266223342.5K
  17. 苫米地英人✓@DrTomabechi
    In the same week as PHP2Shell, the incident most widely reported in Japan was unauthorised access to “ Desktop Cloud”, a VPS service for automated foreign-exchange (FX) trading provided by GMO Internet. According to its announcements and press reports, events unfolded as follows. The intrusion route has not been disclosed. GMO has stated that “a security problem existed in the system of this service”, but has not said whether PHP was running or whether PHP2Shell was involved. The malicious program was confirmed on 20 October, before the PHP2Shell fixes were published (the evening of 21 October) and after pre-disclosure exploitation attempts were observed (17 October), but timing alone cannot establish a link. This paper does not count the case as PHP2Shell damage. Claims made by the attacker side, such as the routes of intrusion and data theft, are also unverified. Even so, the case matters for this paper’s argument. First, even with a VPS as the hosting arrangement, the damage reached inside customers’ servers. The malicious program was placed in customers’ server environments, and trading-account credentials stored on the servers were targeted. Virtualisation boundaries separate customers from one another, but they do not protect the software running inside each server or the secrets kept there. The provider is also collecting and analysing customers’ own devices, so concern now extends to those devices too. Second, to prevent the damage from spreading, the provider stopped the servers on all plans (26,739 servers were described as potentially affected). Control panels, server creation and restoration, and remote-access infrastructure that reach many servers form common management infrastructure, where a breach at one point can spread to the whole. Which part was breached in this case has not been disclosed, but the fact that a complete shutdown had to be chosen illustrates the danger. Third, the provider decided not to restart the existing platform as it was and offered customers migration to an alternative service on an independent cloud platform. In not continuing to use a compromised environment and rebuilding from a trustworthy state, this is in line with the immutable infrastructure of Section 10. So whether or not PHP was running, the questions the case put to organisations are the same as those of PHP2Shell. What runs where (the asset register)? Who fixed what and when, and did the fix reach the running systems (responsibility and evidence for updates)? Which secrets sit on servers, and how far can an intruder reach (least privilege and secret management)? Can credentials and sessions be revoked immediately (response)? Can environments be rebuilt from trustworthy artefacts (recovery)? Moving to a VPS only redistributes these questions between provider and customer; it does not remove them. A DevSecOps capability is essential on one’s own servers, on a VPS and in the cloud alike. English updated version Reengineering National Cyber Resilience Around Existing Systems - A Two-Stage DevSecOps Policy Informed by PHP2Shell, the History of ARPANET, UNIX and Mach, and Memory Safety Hideto Tomabechi CyLab Carnegie Mellon University, C5I Center George Mason University, Cognitive Research Laboratories
    苫米地英人 @DrTomabechi
    Policy and engineering paper For government officials Reengineering National Cyber Resilience Around Existing Systems A Two-Stage DevSecOps Policy Informed by PHP2Shell, the History of ARPANET, UNIX and Mach, and Memory Safety Hideto Tomabechi Abstract In October 2026, two defects discovered at the core of the PHP runtime (CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619, known as PHP2Shell) forced the simultaneous shutdown of web services in government, finance, transport, broadcasting and commerce across many countries, Japan among them. In Japan alone, at least 246 organisations, including national ministries, local governments, banks, an airline, electric utilities, universities and hosting providers, announced service suspensions. Government websites in Europe and Canada were taken offline as a precaution. At a European government entity, post-compromise lateral movement was confirmed, and the attacker’s activity showed signs of an AI agent. [52,53,57,58] This paper treats the incident not as an isolated bug but as the expression of a structural problem. PHP applications are written in PHP, but the engine that runs them is written in C. C and UNIX were created for a small, mutually trusting research community, and they still delegate the correctness of memory allocation and release to the programmer. Public administration now runs on this foundation at scale, in an environment where anonymous attackers, including state actors, are permanently connected. The world’s operating systems and language runtimes cannot be replaced at once. The central thesis of this paper is that without fundamentally changing the operating system or programming language, governments can redesign development, procurement, deployment and operations as DevSecOps, and in doing so shrink the attack surface, the probability of compromise, the reach of an intruder, the time to remediate and the time to recover; and these effects multiply. As a second stage, high-risk components that process external input should be migrated progressively, with AI assistance, to languages and runtimes with strong memory safety and fault isolation, such as ANSI Common Lisp, Erlang and Rust. The paper establishes the facts of the incident from primary sources and from inspection of the fix itself, explains the origin of today’s risk through the history of ARPANET, UNIX, BSD and Mach, and proposes the controls and implementation sequence that governments should mandate. It aims at a level of rigour that engineers can verify while giving policymakers plain-language explanations in every section. All code shown was compiled and run in the author’s environment, and its output is reproduced.
    48028426.8K
  18. 苫米地英人✓@DrTomabechi
    Policy and engineering paper For government officials Reengineering National Cyber Resilience Around Existing Systems A Two-Stage DevSecOps Policy Informed by PHP2Shell, the History of ARPANET, UNIX and Mach, and Memory Safety Hideto Tomabechi Abstract In October 2026, two defects discovered at the core of the PHP runtime (CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619, known as PHP2Shell) forced the simultaneous shutdown of web services in government, finance, transport, broadcasting and commerce across many countries, Japan among them. In Japan alone, at least 246 organisations, including national ministries, local governments, banks, an airline, electric utilities, universities and hosting providers, announced service suspensions. Government websites in Europe and Canada were taken offline as a precaution. At a European government entity, post-compromise lateral movement was confirmed, and the attacker’s activity showed signs of an AI agent. [52,53,57,58] This paper treats the incident not as an isolated bug but as the expression of a structural problem. PHP applications are written in PHP, but the engine that runs them is written in C. C and UNIX were created for a small, mutually trusting research community, and they still delegate the correctness of memory allocation and release to the programmer. Public administration now runs on this foundation at scale, in an environment where anonymous attackers, including state actors, are permanently connected. The world’s operating systems and language runtimes cannot be replaced at once. The central thesis of this paper is that without fundamentally changing the operating system or programming language, governments can redesign development, procurement, deployment and operations as DevSecOps, and in doing so shrink the attack surface, the probability of compromise, the reach of an intruder, the time to remediate and the time to recover; and these effects multiply. As a second stage, high-risk components that process external input should be migrated progressively, with AI assistance, to languages and runtimes with strong memory safety and fault isolation, such as ANSI Common Lisp, Erlang and Rust. The paper establishes the facts of the incident from primary sources and from inspection of the fix itself, explains the origin of today’s risk through the history of ARPANET, UNIX, BSD and Mach, and proposes the controls and implementation sequence that governments should mandate. It aims at a level of rigour that engineers can verify while giving policymakers plain-language explanations in every section. All code shown was compiled and run in the author’s environment, and its output is reproduced.
    2307232.1K
  19. Csaba Kissi✓@csaba_kissi
    6 free apps and webs for web developers - Open-source AI design skill - App hosting for PHP, NodeJS, Go, Rust ... - Free AI coding IDE - 86 free Shadcn components - Open-source HTML-to-video - 421 design inspirations
    Download
    31161428.5K
  20. GGSec@GGASecDe
    Research: we reproduced CVE-2026-109618/109619 on php:8.4.26-apache (aarch64). Pure HTTP - no gdb, no /proc on target. 4 requests: arm -> 819,200-byte disclosure -> addresses -> system() as www-data. 6/6 runs, ASLR different every time. Tonight: every step
    Download
    42313716.6K
  21. 𝖘𝖕𝖔𝖔𝖐𝖞 𝖘𝖙𝖆𝖗 💫🎃 | leyendo Hollanov ♡@amberhepburn_
    no entiendo, se cayó de la nada, no le avisaron a nadie y ahora dicen que tomara entre dos a CUATRO semanas restaurar el servicio? que pasa?!?? nos están atacando? se quemaron los servidores? no entiendo nada
    AO3 Status @AO3_Status
    We estimate that service restoration for #AO3 will take around 2 weeks but it could be up to 4 weeks. We are hopeful that we will be able to bring the site back up in a degraded state sooner. Refer to our status page for updates:
    9067017.4K494K
  22. AO3 Status@AO3_Status
    We estimate that service restoration for #AO3 will take around 2 weeks but it could be up to 4 weeks. We are hopeful that we will be able to bring the site back up in a degraded state sooner. Refer to our status page for updates:
    15.8K51.5K410K40.3M
  23. kenny 🍉@KenzieFive
    @amberhepburn_
    @amberhepburn_ Sounds like, with the PHP threat, they did the initial 12hrs to do an patch/update investigation but there was probably a discovery that lead to the need to rebuild the site. Probably not something they decided very easily but a necessity. The team are also volunteers
    7231.8K58.9K
  24. Felipe Daragon✓@FelipeDaragon
    🚨 Another week, another critical vulnerability addressed in PHP. CVE-2026-111497 (Brotli) scores 9.2 CVSS. PHP released updated Windows builds today (Oct-26) to address the vulnerability in its bundled Brotli library. Linux installations may also be exposed through vulnerable system Brotli dependencies, which require separate updates. #php #cybersecurity
    19130522104K
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