Dr Filippa Lentzos

In #UNGA81 #FirstCommittee, #bioweapons took centre stage last wk. States pressed for progress on strengthening #1972BWC but divisions persist over verification & compliance. Our latest briefing examines what’s at stake ahead of December’s negotiations.

In a world first, the UK launches an #AI #Biosecurity Lab. Backed by £300M of government funding and company commitments, AIBL will develop technical capabilities that help the UK better understand, prevent, detect & respond to #biothreats.

How are #disinformation, AI and geopolitical tensions reshaping #biosecurity? @gmbowsher and I join @drjuliapearce on the @KingsWarStudies podcast to discuss biological threats, health security in conflict, and the future of arms control. 🎧:

RT @warstudies: How does biology become part of war? @drjuliapearce is joined by @FilippaLentzos and Dr Gemma Bowsher to discuss CBRN disinformation, Russia’s bio narratives around Ukraine, AI and the future of biosecurity governance. 🎧: 👓:

RT @LexIntl_org: Thread: 7 facts about AI weapons from our documentary Will We Let AI Kill People?

RT @LexIntl_org: Watch now:

Full statement here:

The @GPWMDofficial Counter Disinfo Initiative made a statement to #UNGA81 #FirstCommittee today on why #disinformation matters for arms control. Our central point: CBRN-related disinformation is not simply about getting facts wrong. It is about weakening trust.

CivSoc statement on #bioweapons to #UNGA81 #FirstCommittee says #1972BWC must keep pace with changing biorisks shaped by #AI, synbio & lab automation. Delivered by @Alex_Phelan, it calls for progress on S&T review, compliance, verification, investigations

The more immediate #AI #bioweapons concern is not that AI suddenly enables amateurs but that it amplifies already capable actors, I told @guardian. The key question is which barriers AI lowers, for whom, and at what points in the biological threat pathway.

“Anticipation is about preserving our capacity to act, rather than simply react.” A good framing from Swiss State Secretary Alexandre Fasel at #GESDASummit. Pleased to join the Engineering Life panel to discuss emerging biothreats and the governance gaps they expose. #biosecurity

RT @KCLSecurity: How does biology become part of war? @drjuliapearce is joined by @FilippaLentzos and Dr Gemma Bowsher to discuss CBRN disinformation, Russia’s bio narratives around Ukraine, AI and the future of biosecurity governance. 🎧: 👓:

RT @yohanblavignat: Soupçons de peste en Russie, l'éclairage de @FilippaLentzos, maître de conférences au @KingsCollegeLon : "Le problème tient moins à une urgence sanitaire qu’à l’incertitude"

A stress test is not a threat map. Lower barriers do not mean low barriers. And biological risk extends far below the threshold of catastrophe. @FuturistYB and I on what Biological War gets wrong — and why it matters for biosecurity policy.

RT @FuturistYB: @FilippaLentzos and I just published a @BulletinAtomic (thanks, @MatthewField2!) article about @AnnieJacobsen’s recent book: “Biological War: a Scenario”. You can read the article here:

RT @unherd: The lesson of the Russian plague, by Filippa Lentzos (@FilippaLentzos) It’s important to understand that there is nothing inherently sinister about having an anti-plague institute in Siberia. Plague did not disappear with the Black Death. Yersinia pestis still circulates naturally in populations of rodents and their fleas, including across parts of Russia, Mongolia and Central Asia. While human infections are relatively rare, the Irkutsk institute grew out of this natural prevalence. The regional anti-plague institute for Siberia and the Russian Far East has, for more than a century, monitored dangerous infections, investigated natural disease reservoirs and maintained specialist teams capable of responding to outbreaks of plague, anthrax, cholera and other serious infectious diseases. Read more:

Good to see @TheEconomist drawing on my work in its coverage of the reported Siberian plague incident. My key point: transparency matters. Without a clear account of what happened and how the incident was handled, uncertainty inevitably fuels speculation.

RT @unherd: The lesson of the Russian plague, by Filippa Lentzos (@FilippaLentzos) Within weeks of Covid reaching Europe, when discussion of the origin of the enfolding pandemic was already becoming politically toxic, I argued that a credible investigation was needed to examine all plausible routes of emergence. Evidence of SARS-CoV-2‘s evolutionary history could not, by itself, establish how it first entered the human population. A naturally occurring virus could pass directly from animals to people. It could also, in principle, infect somebody collecting animals or samples in the field, or someone subsequently working with them. Distinguishing between those routes requires different kinds of evidence. Instead, the Covid origins question became trapped in geopolitics. On one side, to raise the possibility of a research-related accident came to be treated as equivalent to promoting a conspiracy theory. On the other, the absence of transparency was taken as proof that a lab leak had occurred. Intelligence agencies were asked to resolve questions that would require scientific, epidemiological and forensic investigation. Years later, we still lack a definitive explanation that commands broad international confidence. That failure is directly relevant to Irkutsk. Read more:

We still don’t know exactly what happened at Russia’s Irkutsk anti-plague institute. That uncertainty is the problem. My new piece for @unherd on why we need better ways to investigate possible lab-linked outbreaks:

Agree 💯 @ggronvall

It’s true, we have been here before! But I think what it reveals is even more interesting. In Sverdlovsk, declassified docs demonstrate the US knew pretty much what happened immediately when USSR had a huge accident in an illegal anthrax production facility. US diplomats happily

The biggest problem with the Siberian plague incident right now is the lack of clear, consistent information, I tell @Telegraph.